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NOTES
UNTRIED USE AND VALUATION OF CONDEMNED LAND
IN NEW YORK
Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.'
If a condemnor is successful in a New York condemnation
proceeding, the court will appoint three commissioners to ascertain
the compensation to be awarded to the condemnee.2 The determin-
ation of what constitutes "just compensation" is basically a judicial
question, not within the realm of legislative action.3  Case law
throughout the country indicates that the market value of the
land at the time of appropriation is the proper measure of com-
pensation.4  The determination of a condemnation award where all
of the condemnee's property has been acquired has been judged
"relatively simple" under the market value method of valuation.5
However, rather than clarifying the meaning of "just compensation,"
this method merely equates "just compensation" to the relatively
vague concept of "market value," which itself requires clarification.
In an effort to distinguish those elements which should be considered
in determining the market value of land, the courts of New York
have applied several general rules.
Elements of Market Value
Implied within the "market value" method of valuation is the
theory that a compensation award should be an estimate of the
1 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). A similar provision is found in the federal
constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 N.Y. CONDEM. LAW § 13.
3Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
However, the legislature can make provisions concerning compensation if
such are not detrimental to the rights of the owner to a minimum award.
4 NictoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.1[3] (rev. 3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as 4 NicHoLs]. Within the area of untried uses, it has been stated
that "a statutory rule defining the elements of just compensation in terms
of available use . . . would not be feasible." N.Y. CITY LAW DEP'T, RE-
PORT ON LAW AND PROCEDURE IN CONDEMNATION 158 (1951).
4 See cases cited in 4 NicHoLs § 12.2 n.1. In exceptional cases, how-
ever, in which the application of this measure would be unjust, it is not
employed. JAHr, EMINENT DOMAIN 102-03 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
JAHR].
SLvay & MANHEIMER, CONDEMNATION IN NEW YORK 75 (1937).
highest purchase price which the land would bring on the open
market, and not an appraisal of the subjective value of the land
to either the condemnor or the condemnee.7 The award should
reflect the value to a potential purchaser; "it centers attention on
some sort of sale price. . . ." I However, since the purchase price
would vary in relation to the necessity to sell on the part of the
owner and the buyer's capacity and desire to acquire land, a
further definition of "market value" is required.
The rule in New York is that the award to the condemnee
should represent "the amount which one desiring but not com-
pelled to purchase will pay under ordinary conditions to a seller
who desires but is not compelled to sell." ' Although the
terminology of this "willing buyer-willing seller" standard is
designed to eliminate the consideration of forced-sale prices, it is
not definitive of the factors which would influence such a "willing
buyer" or "willing seller." "o This rule does not compensate for
certain special situations."' Although hardships may result in these
circumstances, the courts have nonetheless applied the same standard.
It has been determined that any fact which the theoretical
"willing seller" might bring to the attention of the "willing buyer"
in order to influence his decision to purchase, or to affect the price
which he is willing to pay, must be considered in the valuation
process. 12  This is based on the concept' 3 that
0 Robert$ v. City of New York, 295 U.S. 264, 284 (1935); Matter of
City of Rochester [Smith St. Bridge], 234 App. Div. 583, 586, 255 N.Y.
Supp. 801, 807 (4th Dep't 1932).
7 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EmIEXT DOmAIN §§ 13,
14 (2d ed. 1953); see United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., 229 U.S. 53, 80-81 (1913); Cookinham v. Village of Richfield
Springs, 140 Misc. 760, 761, 251 N.Y. Supp. 520, 523 (Sup. Ct 1931);
Matter of Town of Frankfort, 193 Misc. 617, 620, 84 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81
(Herkimer County Ct 1948).
8 1 ORGEL, op. cit. mepra note 7, § 15 at 76.
9 Matter of Bd. of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 457, 14 N.E.2d 789,
791 (1938); Heiman v. Bishop, 272 N.Y. 83, 86, 4 N.E.2d 944, 945 (1936).
Accord, Matter of City of Rochester [Smith St Bridge], supra note 6,
at 586, 255 N.Y. Supp. at 807; School Dist. v. Wicks, 227 N.Y.S.2d 768,
771 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See JAHR 97-100; 4 NicuoL.s § 12.2[1].
10See generally 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 20.
1 An insolvent owner may be willing to sell the land at a forced-sale
price in order to obtain capital immediately, rather than receive a greater
payment at the completion of condemnation proceedings. Id. §22. An
owner may be capable of finding an individual purchaser who is in such
urgent need of acquiring the land that he is willing to pay an unusually
high price for the opportunity. Id. § 23.
12 See Matter of City of New York [Blackvell's Island Bridge],
198 N.Y. 84, 88, 91 N.E. 278, 279 (1910); Matter of City of Rochester
[Smith St. Bridge], supra note 6, at 586, 255 N.Y. Supp. at 806; Heintz
v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 1025, 1030, 226 N.Y.S.2d 540, 545 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
13 Matter of City of New York [School. of Industrial Arts], 2 Misc.
2d 403, 407, 154 N.Y.S2d 402, 407 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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the law of supply and demand will furnish a more correct index of value
and that "market value," the standard in condemnation, is determined not
so much by cost as by the relative desirability, abundance and utility of
the particular property in the community.
It is clear that there is a possibility that certain land may
possess a latent utility which, although providing a degree of
attraction to a potential purchaser, was never exploited by the
present owner. This situation could exist because the owner was
unwilling or unable to put the land to that specific use, or because
he intended to so utilize the land in the future but was prevented
from executing his plan when the land was condemned. It is like-
wise possible that an owner might intend to use his land in 'the
future for a purpose which, although it would provide him personal
satisfaction or value, would not enhance the "relative desirability"
of the property on the open market. It is the purpose of this
note to consider the problem of land valuation with specific reference
to the effect of future but untried uses 14 upon the market value
of land.
1. Utntried Uses
In estimating land value on the open market, i.e., in predicting
a selling price agreeable to a "willing buyer" and a "willing
seller,"
it must be assumed that the property would be valued for its most profitable
use and where a particular piece of property is enhanced by a present
recognition of its adaptability and suitability for a particular use, such elements
must be considered. 15
Attention must be given, therefore, to "every element of usefulness
and advantage in the property," including location and availability
for "any useful purpose whatever." 16
Since it is market value, and not the value to the owner,
which is to be determined, there is no requirement that value
14A distinction must be made between the terms "future" and
"untried." Future use may refer t6 the continuation of a present use into
the future. Thus, a condemnee might request that evidence of present in-
come and predicted future income from the land be allowed, since it
would affect the market value of the land if purchased for the same use.
This area is beyond the scope of the present discussion.15 Andrews v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 217, 220, 188 N.Y.S.2d 854,. 858 (Ct.
Cl. 1959), aff'd mern., 11 App. Div. 2d 599, 200 N.Y.S.2d 451 (3d Dep't
1960), aff'd inem., 9 N.Y.2d 606, 176 N.E.2d 42, 217 N.Y.S.2d 9, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961).
16Matter of City of New York [Water Front on E. River], 213
App. Div. 187, 190, 210 N.Y. Supp. 387, 390 (1st Dep't 1925).
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be based on a use to which the owner has previously or presently
devoted the land."7 Thus, it has been stated that
an owner might allow a parcel of vacant property to remain undeveloped
indefinitely. . . Land, which may have been accumulating nothing but
arrears of taxes, thereupon [upon condemnation] suddenly develops
enormously valuable "potentialities." Is
A condemnee may be permitted to recover compensation based
upon the "potentialities" of his property because
property is not to be deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go
to waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he is unable to put it to
any use. Others may be able to use it. . . . Its capability of being made
thus available gives it a market value which can be readily estimated.19
The potential use, in relation to which the condemnee's land is
to be valuated, has been termed the "most advantageous use";20
it has more accurately been referred to as the "best available use." 21
Problems arising from the vagueness of such general terminology
can be resolved only by determining the elements which constitute
"availability."
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
the highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and
needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be con-
sidered . . . to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use
affects the market value while the property is privately held. 22
It seems clear from this statement that "availability" consists
of (1) the need for such land for a certain use, and (2) the
recognizable influence of the land's potential to enhance its value
17 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); Matter of City
of New York [Clearview Expressway], 9 N.Y.2d 439, 445, 174 N.E.2d
522, 525, 214 N.Y.S.2d 438, 442 (1961); Matter of City of New York
[Water Front on E. River], supra note 16; Walker v. State, 33 Misc. 2d
668, 671, 227 N.Y.S.2d 58, 61 (Ct Cf. 1961); JAHR 111-14; 4 NICHOLS§ 12.3142.
is N.Y. Cn LAw DuP'T, op. cit. supra note 3, at vi.
194 NICHOLS § 12.314, at 161.
20Olson v. United States, supra note 17; Sparkhill Realty Corp. v.
State, 254 App. Div. 78, 82, 4 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (3d Dep't), aff'd mere.,
279 N.Y. 656, 18 N.E.2d 301 (1938); Board of Supervisors v. Sherlo
Realty, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 579, 585, 224 N.Y.S.2d 244, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
aff'd mme;., 19 App. Div. 2d 590, 240 N.Y.S.2d 950 (4th Dep't 1963).2 1 Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668 (1925);
Humbert v. State, 278 App. Div. 1041, 107 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (4th Dep't
1951), aff'd men;., 303 N.Y. 929, 105 N.E.2d 504 (1952); Walker v.
State, spra note 17.
220Oson v. United States, supra note 17.
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on the open market. The first element may be termed "market-
ability"; the latter may be called "adaptability." There seems
to be some confusion in the case law of New York as to the
relative importance of these two elements when considered with
a third factor, i.e., the condemnee's intention, or lack of intention,
to use or sell the land for the purpose claimed as the "best
available use."
2. Marketability
As has been indicated, land may be valued in relation to a
future untried use since the object of valuation proceedings is to
determine the market value of the land. It is obvious that there
will be no market value for a potential use unless there is a market
for that use. In other words, whether or not a future use will
be considered in determining market value is dependent upon
"whether or not purchasers can be found who would pay more for
it [the land] because of the adaptability to the use. .... , 23 A
market is deemed to exist only when such purchasers are found
"in substantial numbers." 24 It is well established in New York
law that marketability, which is influenced by the possibility of a
future use, is the sine qua non, without which untried uses will
not be considered in the valuation process.2 5
It is important to note that the effect of the future use is the
controlling factor. Land is not to be valued as if it were being
employed for the use claimed; rather, it is to be valued in relation
\ to the enhancement of market value resulting from the possibility
of the potential buyer converting the land to a future use. If
the best possible use of certain land is for the construction of an
apartment house, the market price is not that of apartment house
real estate, but is the price a purchaser would pay in order to have
the opportunity to build the apartment house himself. Of course,
such a purchaser would also consider the investment required before
such potential use could be realized. For this reason, the market
price of land adaptable to a future use would necessarily be less
than that of land which was already being used for that purpose.
23 New York Cent. R.R. v. Maloney, 234 N.Y. 208, 218, 137 N.E. 305,
309 (1922). Accord, Board of Supervisors v. Sherlo Realty, Inc., supra
note 20, at 586, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 253; Dillenbeck v. State, 193 Misc. 542, 547,
83 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314 (Ct. C1. 1948), aff'd mere., 275 App. Div. 871, 88
N.Y.S.2d 389 (3d Dep't 1949).
24 Matter of Bd. of Water Supply, sepra note 9, at 459, 14 N.E.2d
at 792.
25 Fowler v. State, 234 App. Div. 166, 168, 254 N.Y. Supp. 446, 448
(3d Dep't 1931), aff'd mnem., 259 N.Y. 594, 182 N.E. 195 (1932); Matter
of Simmons, 130 App. Div. 350, 352, 114 N.Y. Supp. 571, 573 (3d Dep't),
aff'd mnein., 195 N.Y. 573, 88 N.E. 1132 (1909); In re Daly, 18 App.
Div. 194, 197, 45 N.Y. Supp. 785, 789 (2d Dep't 1897). See also cases
cited note 23 supra.
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3. Adaptability - A Question for Experts
If it can be shown that certain property is marketable for
a future use, it must be determined (1) whether the land is' more
valuable by reason of its potentiality, and (2) to what extent the
value is enhanced. For example, if a condemnee claims that his
property may be best utilized for residential development, he
must show more than the fact that it is possible to split up a tract into
building lots. He must show that the tract is in or near a town and that a
possible purchaser of the property would take into consideration the avail-
ability of the land for such building lots. 26
The proof of these elements, and the estimation of the extent to
which they would enhance market value, is largely a matter of
expert testimony and evidence 2
7
The practice of determining awards on the basis of the
opinions of experts has been justified by the belief that "genuine
and accurate verdicts reflecting actual market value will result." 28
However, this method has also been assailed, on the ground that
"availability and practicability are, essentially, not matters of
definition, nor matters of fact, but matters of opinion [in which]
. . . actual skill, judgment and experience play a smaller role . . .
than in any other form of expert testimony." 29 The criticism of
expert testimony has sometimes been vehement:
Many experts unwarrantably assume a superior attitude and endeavor to
leave the impression that wisdom will die with them. The triers of the
fact should not be condemned in failing to be convinced by their egotism
and their pretensions.39
Greater travesty of justice could hardly be imagined, for the result depends
altogether on the integrity and intelligence of professional witnesses, who
can testify as they please on hearsay with complete irresponsibility.31
Although these arguments appear valid, the court must some-
how determine whether the use claimed is too remote or speculative
2 6 LEVEY & MANHEIMER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 93-94.27in re Mountain Lakes in Westchester, Inc., 219 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
SComment, Hearsay Testimony in Condemnation Cases, 6 ARiz. L.
REv. 112, 120 (1964).2 9N.Y. CrY LAw DEP'T, REPORT ON LA.W AND PROCEUR INq CON-
DEmNAT ON 153 (1951). "[T]he judgment as to available use is more
personal than judicial-matter of impression rather than judgment." Id.
at 154.
30Board of Hudson River Regulating Dist. v. Cady, 131 Misc. 768,
769-70, 228 N.Y. Supp. 159, 161 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
31 N.Y. CIr LAw DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 29, at iv. "[S]uch opin-
ions are often in the highest degree haphazard and irresponsible,- if not
worse." Id. at iii.
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to actually affect and enhance the value of the property on the
open market. This judgment requires some method or basis of
decision, and expert testimony seems to be the only practical and
available means of determining adaptability. A manifestation of
intention on the part of the condemnee to use or sell his land for
the use claimed might provide evidence in support of the expert's
opinion of adaptability-it would tend to show that the potential
use would enhance the market price. However, it appears that
the element of manifest intention is not requisite for the consideration
of a future'use in valuation proceedings.
4. Adaptability Without Intention
It has been demonstrated that adaptability is determined by
the intrinsic potential of the land which would justify an enhance-
ment of its value; it may be unrelated to the time or effort required
to improve the land in order to realize such potential. "  In New
York, it has been held that if land is adaptable for a certain use,
it is reversible error to exclude from the valuation proceedings
evidence of such adaptability. 33 But it is more difficult to determine
whether adaptability alone, without any manifestation of intent
to utilize the land for the future use claimed, requires valuation
on the basis of an untried use. Because a discussion of the degree
of adaptability and manifest intention in the circumstances of each
case is treated in the text of individual court decisions, it may
appear unclear which is the controlling factor of the court's rationale.
A consideration of several cases in the area will serve as the basis
for deducing principles which will clarify the relative importance
of adaptability and manifest intention.
\ In Matter of City of New York [Clearview Expressway] ,3
the condemnee claimed that the best use to which his land could
be put was the construction of apartment houses. The fact that
the land was adaptable to this use was not contested. The question
on appeal was not the possibility or desirability of such a project,
but rather, the importance of the fact that the condemnee "didn't
think enough of the availability of financing" 3- to undertake the
construction himself. The court of appeals held that
52Land has been valued in relation to its potential use as a site for
commercial buildings although "the productivity of the property based
upon use as a shopping center was some millions of dollars removed in
terms of investment and not less than a year removed in terms of time
*. " Levin v. State, 8 Misc. 2d 33, 166 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Ct Cl. 1957).33 Matter of City of New York [Inwood Hill Park], 230 App. Div.
41, 243 N.Y. Supp. 63 (lst Dep't 1930), aff'd nem., 256 N.Y. 556, 177
N.E. 138 (1931).
349 N.Y.2d 439, 174 N.E.2d 522, 214 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1961).
35 Id. at 444, 174 N.E.2d at 525, 214 N.Y.S2d at 442.
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the fact that they did not put the property to the best use for which it was
available because of a temporary stringency in'the money market, or their
own financial inability, should not deprive them of the fair potential value
of the property... 86
It may be concluded from this decision that, under the specific
circumstances of financial impossibility or difficulty, an untried
use of land adaptable to that use will be considered in valuation
even though the condemnee did not manifest an intention to
take advantage of the adaptability himself.
The Clearview decision could be based on either of two
principles: (1) the lack of manifest intention will not defeat
a claim of best possible use only if the absence of intention results
from financial inability; or, (2) the lack of manifest intention
will never invalidate such a claim, on the theory that market
value is not affected by the condemnee's plans, but rather by
the potentialities in the land for which a prospective buyer.
would pay a certain price. The decision is unclear as to which
of these the court applied. Thus, the case is direct authority
only for the proposition that lack of intent under conditions
of financial difficulty. will not justify the rejection of the
condemnee's claim. The broader question, i.e., the materiality of
intention in the presence of financial capability, was left un-
answered by the Clearview decision.
It would appear that there are two reasonable solutions
to this question. It could be reasoned that, since the condemnee
never intended to take advantage of the land's potentialities, an
award based upon future use would represent profits to the
condemnee which he would never have realized, if it were not
for the condemnation. On the other hand, it could be argued
that condemnation deprives the owner of the opportunity to
change his mind, and utilize the land for such purposes in the
future, or sell it to one who would use it to full advantage.
Later case law appears to clarify the New York viewpoint on
this question.
In Albany Country Club v. State,37 the land in question
Was owned by a country club, but had never been used as part
of its golf course or devoted to the benefit of its members.
The condemnee claimed that this land on the perimeter of the
property was available for commercial and residential development.
38 Id. at 445, 174 N.E.2d at 525, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
3 37 Misc. 2d 134, 235 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Ct. Cl. 1962), aff'd, 19 App. Div.
2d 199, 241 N.Y.S.2d 604 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 13 N.Y2d 1085, 196 N.E.2d
62, 246 N.Y.S2d 407 (1963). Only part of the condemned property was
claimed to be most profitably valued for untried uses. It is the decision
in relation to this land which is pertinent to this discussion.
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"Shortly before the appropriation the claimant initiated steps
to determine the best use for the surplus land . . . but had
actually done little else to utilize such property." A11  previous
case had held that contemplated improvement, if manifested for
the first time only shortly before condemnation, without any
attempt to start improvement, did not show an intention to
use the land for a future purpose.39  However, despite this
authority to find the manifestation of intention invalid, the
lower court in Albany valuated the property on the basis of
the untried use. The appellate division approved the method
of valuation, but considering the proximity of the land to two
highways, the rising value of land in the area, and the comparative
sales of similar land, it modified the judgment of the lo-ier
court by increasing the award to the condemnee.40 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed,"' impliedly confirming both the
standard of valuation applied by the lower court and the modi-
fication by the appellate division.
Since the condemnee in Albany had not made plans, caused
maps to be drawn, or contractually committed himself to the
improvement of his land, but had only initiated steps to determine
the best use, this case appears to indicate that if the land is
adaptable for an untried use, that use will be considered even
though the condemnee's intention is minimal. It is unclear,
however, whether the court completely disregarded the last-
minute show of intention on the part of the condemnee. Since
condemnation plans usually can be anticipated, an owner of
land may conceivably initiate steps to determine the best use
of the land, even though he had no prior intent to do so. The
decision in the Albany case may permit an increase in award
based upon this meager evidence of intent. However, it remains
uncertain whether even a minimal indication of intention is
required.
In Andrews v. State,42 the appropriated property consisted of
land which had been improved by a house, horse barn, granary
and shed. In the past, the property had been used as a tenant
farm and a ferrying point. The court considered the land as
38 Id. at 136, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
391n re Mountain Lakes in Westchester, Inc., supra note 27, at 146.40Albany Country Club v. State, 19 App. Div. 2d 199, 241 N.Y.S.2d
604 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1085, 196 N.E.2d 62, 246 N.Y.S.2d 407
(1963).
41 Albany Country Club v. State, 13 N.Y.2d 1085, 196 N.E.2d 62, 246
N.Y.S.2d 407 (1963).
42Andrews v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 217, 188 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1959),
aff'd tnern., 11 App. Div. 2d 599,, 200 N.Y.S.2d 451 (3d Dep't 1960),
aff'd mern., 9 N.Y.2d 606, 176 N.E.2d 42, 217 N.Y.S.2d 9, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 929 (1961).
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adaptable "for industrial and commercial purposes, including uses
arising from and connected with the development of hydro-
electric power and the St. Lawrence Seaway," 43 although the
claimant had never contemplated using the land for this purpose,
and had never manifested any intention to sell the property to
one who would so use it. The decision to consider this untried
and unintended use was based on "evidence of a demand, desire
and need for this type of use in the area and [testimony that]
this property was suitable for and adaptable to such use."' "4
In this case, there was no express consideration of the
condemnee's financial inability to realize the potential use of the
land. It was obvious, however, that the property could have
been sold for a greater price by reason of its adaptability.
The court apparently valued the land in relation to its at-
tractiveness to a potential purchaser, completely disregarding the
lack of manifest intention on the part of the condemnee. The
case appears to hold, therefore, that land will be valued with
respect to a future use to which it is adaptable, even when there
is io manifest intention on the part of the owner to take ad-
vantage of such potentiality. This seems to be a valid rule,
considering the fact that market value depends on the thoughts,
plans and intentions of the theoretical "willing buyer" and not
the extent of development or improvement intended by the
condemnee. Although it may be argued that the award provides
windfall profits for the owner, it must be remembered that
the owner theoretically could have obtained the same profit on
the open market had he not been compelled to sell to the
state.
In addition, further case lav seems to support the result
reached in Andrews. In Hewitt v. State,45 the appellate division
declared that there was "no question but that the land involved
was in a residential zone and that its best and highest use
at the time was as a potential real estate subdivision." 46 How-
ever, it was specifically noted that there had been no subdivision,
no maps had been filed, no lots had been offered for sale-
in short, the condemnee had not manifested an intention to
use the land for the use claimed. Further, it had been stated
in the lower court decision 47 that, at the time that the plans
for a government project in the vicinity were announced, there
was "no practical possibility of the claimants' ever developing
43 Id. at 226, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
44 Ibid.
45 18 App. Div. 2d 1128, 239 N.Y.S.2d 522 (4th Dep't 1963).
46 Id. at 1128, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
47 Hewitt v. State, 33 Misc. 2d 868, 227 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Ct. CI. 1961),
aff'd iner., 18 App. Div. 2d 1128, 239 N.Y.S.2d 522 (4th Dep't 1963).
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their premises for residential purposes." 4s Regardless of the lack
of manifest intention and the practical impossibility of the claim-
ants' improving the land, the court allowed the consideration
of the future use, on the theory that "all owners have the
right to hold property in anticipation of a rising market price
or for whatever personal reasons they may have." 49
The lower court had determined the award by subtracting
from the value of the hypothetical subdivision the cost of
development. This, in essence, represented the price which a
potential buyer would pay for the land if it had already been
subdivided, but had not been improved. On appeal, the state
argued that the land should be valuated without reference to the
untried use. The appellate division modified the award, but also
rejected the state's contention, holding:
The correct rule to be applied under the existing conditions was to treat
the premises not as raw acreage nor as part of a completed development
but as a potential subdivision site giving the acreage an increment in value
because of that potential use.50
In essence, the court held that an untried use may be considered
even though there was no intention to so use on the part of the
condemnee. As in the Andrews decision, this case considered
the enhancement of market value resulting from a potential use
of the land. Thus, it would appear that the value of property
may be enhanced by the possibility of untried uses notwith-
standing the absence of an intent to so utilize the land.51
5. The Value of Intention
Although it can be shown that manifest intention is not
necessary before a future untried use will be considered, courts
have included discussion of this element within their rationale.
In the case of In re Mountain Lakes in Westchester, Inc.,
5 2
48 1d. at 870, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
49Id. at 870-71, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 55, citing Matter of City of New
York [Inwood Hill Park], supra note 33. Accord, Heintz v. State, 32
Misc. 2d 1025, 1028, 226 N.Y.S.2d 540, 543 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
50Hewitt v. State, 18 App. Div. 2d 1128, 239 N.Y.S2d 522, 523-24
(4th Dep't 1963) (memorandum decision).51Lasko v. State, 14 App. Div. 2d 637, 218 N.Y.S.2d 135 (3d Dep't
1961); Hazard Lewis Farms v. State, 1 App. Div. 2d 923, 149 N.Y.S.2d
658 (3d Dep't 1956); Town of Pittsford v. Sweeney, 34 Misc. 2d 436, 228
N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Murphy v. State, 41 Misc. 2d 906, 247
N.Y.S.2d 453 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Brubaker v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 458, 214
N.Y.S.2d 838 (Ct. Cl. 1961), aff'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d
395 (3d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 13 N.Y.2d 598,
194 N.E.2d 605, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1963).
52219 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
[ VOL. 39
NOTES
for example, a claim based upon a future use of presently
mountainous land for residential development was rejected. After
concluding that the land was not adaptable to that- use,_ the
court supported its holding by determining that there was no
bona fide intention to so use the land. Such a decision might
lead to the negative inference that the presence of manifest
intention would vitiate the non-adaptability of the property.
However, it may also be argued that the consideration of the
lack of intention was merely supportive of the court's rejection.
The latter viewpoint may be preferable in light of a
prior decision disallowing a claim based on a future use although
the condemnee's intention was unquestionably valid. In Veeder
v. State,53 the condemnee claimed that the best use to which his
property could be devoted was a housing development. Although
his sincerity in claiming that this was his purpose for purchasing
the land could be presumed from the fact that he had successfully
developed other lands in the area, the court rejected his claim
stating that
if the road were extended and if the sewers were built and if the utilities
were extended and if the encroaching settlements . . . did not come closer
to the claimants' land then, and only then, would the value as placed by
the claimants' witnesses become a firm figure for the consideration of the
court.54
The court, in essence, stated that bona fide intention to put
the land to the use claimed would, alone, be insufficient to
increase the award when the increment would be purely
speculative.
If intention cannot remedy a defect in adaptability, of what
importance is it? It must be remembered that the determination
of adaptability, based largely on expert testimony, is a judgment
of the probability of the land's potentialities affecting market
value. Some manifestation of intent may be utilized to strengthen
and support the contention that the land is adaptable:
A proposed use may seem "remote" and "fanciful" if it is still in the
stage of mental consideration. This naturally suggests to certain claimants
or their attorneys that the first thing to do is to give the plan a semblance
of reality and proximity by putting it on paper and making some moves
in the direction of putting it into effect.55
However, if the land is not initially adaptable, such support is
immaterial. A manifestation of intent to take advantage of a future
use cannot render non-adaptable land adaptable:
53 2 Misc. 2d 696, 152 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
54 Id. at 697, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 393.5 N.Y. CiTY LAW D TP'v, op. cit. supra note 29, at 154-55.
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An expenditure of $100 for architect's plans is not the same thing as raising
capital for the laying of sewers, grading of streets and building of apartment
houses.
5 6
Therefore, if land is adaptable for a future untried use, it will
be valued accordingly, even in the absence of any manifest intent
on the part of the condemnee. Conversely, non-adaptable land
will not be valuated in relation to a future use, although the
condemnee's intention to realize such potential use is unquestioned.
These principles must be considered valid when one considers that
(1) a "willing buyer" who would purchase land adaptable to a
future use would not be influenced by the seller's intention, and
(2) a "willing buyer" would not purchase non-adaptable land
for a future use merely because the condemnee planned to so use
it himself.
Related Problems-Zoning and Future Income
There are certain areas related to the present discussion which
present practical problems in valuation proceedings. If the adapt-
ability of the land in question is dependent upon the fulfillment
of a condition outside of the condemnee's control, may he claim
that such adaptability should be considered? If a claim based on
a future untried use is allowed, will the award be determined in
relation to the profits which would be realized from that use? It is
important, in a discussion of the valuation process, to outline the
general rules applicable in cases involving zoning regulations and
the principles regarding the consideration of predicted future
income.
If zoning regulations prevent the use of land for certain
purposes, it is obvious that they obviate the probability of (1)
the property being marketable for such purpose, (2) the potential
enhancement of the market value of the land due to such purposes,
and (3) any manifest intention to exploit such uses. The im-
plications of such a situation present many problems in condemnation
proceedings. 57 Generally, in New York, the determinative criterion
to be applied is the reasonable probability of a change in the
zoning restrictions. 58  Thus, a future use prevented by zoning
restrictions cannot be claimed where there is no reasonable likelihood
56Id. at 158.
57 See generally 4 NICHOLS § 12.322.
58 E.g., County of Westchester v. P. & M. Materials Corp., 38 Misc.
2d 734, 238 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Nelkin v. Town of Oyster
Bay, 14 Misc. 2d 764, 181 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Matter of
Village of Garden City, 9 Misc. 2d 693, 167 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
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that the use may be permitted in the near future by reason of a
change in zoning.2 Conversely, where such reasonable probability
of change can be shown, the claim will be allowed." This reasoning
is based upon the premise that such probability affects the market
value, i.e., that a purchaser may buy the land in reliance upon
such future change, and would pay more for the land because of
the probability of change.6 1
If a claim relating to a future untried use is allowed, a further
question arises: is it proper to consider the projected or potential
profits from that use? From the viewpoint of fundamental prin-
ciples, i.e., market value and "willing buyer-willing seller," it
might appear obvious that such profits may be considered, inasmuch
as they would influence the potential buyer and seller in their
negotiations. But the case law in the state of New York is
unclear in this regard.
There is authority for the viewpoint that prospective profits
from an untried use are too uncertain and speculative to be
considered.6 2  Thus, in Levitin v. State,6 3 the court disallowed a
claim based upon the projected income of a motel to be built
on the condemnee's land. The court decided that "a claim is
improper where it is based entirely on hypothetical profits estimated
from a nonexistent business." 64
In Mattydale Shopping Center, Inc. v. State,65 the appellate
division held that it was error for the court of claims to consider
the prospective profits to be derived from a future use. However,
in reversing this decision and affirming the award of the court
of claims, the court of appeals held that the original method
of valuation was "in accordance with the weight of the evidence." 6 r
Although the rationale of the highest court is not clearly expressed
in the decision, the case is authority for the proposition that
future income may be considered in valuation proceedings.
It seems, therefore, that there is authority to support opposite
viewpoints in regard to the consideration of future income. Per-
59Heintz v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 1025, 226 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
10 Maste v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 370, 206 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dep't
1960), aff'd inem., 9 N.Y.2d 796, 175 N.E.2d 166, 215 N.Y.S.2d 508(1961).61 Valley Stream Lawns, Inc. v. State, 9 App. Div. 2d 149, 152, 192
N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (3d Dep't 1959).
62 See New York Cent. R. v. Maloney, 234 N.Y. 208, 137 N.E. 305
(1922) ; Niagara, Lockport & Ont. Power Co. v. Horton, 231 App. Div.
402, 247 N.Y. Supp. 761 (4th Dep't 1931).
63 12 App. Div. 2d 6, 207 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep't 1960).
64 Id. at 8, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
65279 App. Div. 704, 108 N.Y.S.2d 832 (4th Dep't 1951).
66 Mattydale Shopping Center, Inc. v. State, 303 N.Y. 974, 976, 106
N.E.2d 59, 60 (1952).
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haps a necessary clarification is to be found in a recent decision
of the court of appeals:
[W]here the dealings in the property had been crystallized in binding
agreement And were on the road to fulfillment, the prospective purchaser in
determining the price to pay would have given careful consideration to
the first, albeit subordinate question of prospective rentals. .... 67
It appears from this holding that the determination to consider
or to reject a claim based upon projected profits rests upon the
degree of probability of realizing such profits and the possibility
of ascertaining them. The inference here is that, although the
land is adaptable to a future use, potential profits from that use
will not be considered unless the use is close to being realized, i.e.,
the improvements necessary before the future use can be employed
are "on the road to fulfillment."
Conclusion
The New York decisions in condemnation cases involving a
future untried use rest upon the application of the fundamental
principles of land valuation. In each fact situation, therefore,
it is necessary to view the valuation problems from the viewpoint
of a theoretical purchaser on the open market. All elements
which would influence the price that such a purchaser would be
willing to pay must be considered by the commissioners attempting
to estimate the market value of the land; likewise, those factors
which would determine the price acceptable to a theoretical seller
(not to the individual condemnee involved in the proceedings)
must be considered. Since the potential buyer would be influenced
by the adaptability of the property to future uses, and because the
potential seller would expect to receive a greater price on the
open market by reason of its adaptability, this element must be
considered in valuation. But a purchaser of adaptable land would
not be interested in whether or not the owner had intended to
devote his land to its adaptable use. He certainly would not be
willing to pay a greater price merely because of the owner's in-
tention. All he would really be concerned with would be the land's
adaptability and his own plans for development. Therefore, the
valuation award should reflect the influence of an adaptable use,
regardless of the condemnee's intention to take advantage of that
use himself.
If this theoretical purchaser wished to purchase the land
for a future use, but that purpose was prevented by zoning regu-
67 Levin v. State, 13 N.Y.2d 87, 92, 192 N.E.2d 155, 157, 242 N.Y.S.2d
193, 196 (1963).
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lations, his attitude in regard to purchase price would be determined
by the probability of the restriction being changed in the reasonably
near future. He would not pay more because of a potential use
if it appeared that he would never be able to take advantage
of that use. Therefore, the future use should not be considered
in valuation, unless the potential purchaser could foresee a change
in the zoning laws. In such a case, future use should be considered
since the "willing buyer" might well determine his purchase price
in relation to the probability of such change.
The purchaser on the open market would be influenced by
the profits he could expect to make by reason of his buying the
land. But he would also consider the money he would have to
invest before he could realize such profits. He would not pay
a greater price for the land by reason of its adaptability if actualizing
the future use would require sufficient investment to offset the
value of the adaptability. Therefore, potential income should in-
fluence the determination of market value to the extent that it is
not offset by the investment required to adapt the property.
"Just compensation," therefore, is an award which results in
neither undue hardship nor unwarranted benefit for either party
to the condemnation proceedings. If we admit the existence of
personal or sentimental attachments to certain land which cannot
be bargained for, if we realize that land condemned for a state
highway may be valuated as farmland, the condemnation process
may seem unfair. However, the "common good" basis of the
eminent domain theory sometimes requires individual sacrifices. As
an abstract concept, "just compensation" may correctly be con-
sidered the goal, rather than the product, of our case law.
MVAIC Six YEARs LATER - A PRACTICAL APPRAISAL
The mounting toll of highway accident victims suffering death
or bodily injury has presented many problems of varying com-
plexity and scope. Among them, the difficulties in the area of pro-
viding such persons with indemnification against the wrongful
acts of uninsured and financially irresponsible motorists remain
particularly distressing and acute. The New York Legislature's
first step toward a solution to the problem was recognition of the
helpless predicament of innocent auto accident victims whose
common-law remedy proved to be a Pyrrhic victory against the
judgment-proof or uninsured motorist, and nonexistent against the
unknown hit-and-run driver. Concern for the plight of such claim-
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